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Abstract. This article identifies an inbuilt defect of modern Physics. It consists in the lack of 
connection between the two bodies of knowledge that make up Physics: observations of and 
experiments with material things, on the one hand, and mathematical theories, on the other. 
More specifically, the defect consists in that mathematical structures are applied to experiences 
of the material world, as if they were only in the mind of the physicist. Nevertheless, the success 
of mathematical Physics suggests that these mathematical structures are somehow related to 
the material realities they are applied to. – Due to the inbuilt defect, mathematical theories in 
Physics have to undergo a procedure of approval or disapproval by experiments. However, 
even if approved, the hypothetical character of such a theory cannot be removed. A theory 
never becomes definitive. - The roots of the said defect lie in the scientific revolution during the 
16th and 17th centuries. This article makes three of them explicit: (i) the dominant view that 
Nature and human cognitive capacities do not fit together, (ii) most present day ways of 
understanding Mathematics do not involve the material world, and (iii) the scientific revolution 
has essentially brought, for Physics, its mathematization. - It is proposed that Thomistic 
hylomorphism is a suitable tool to show how those mathematical structures that are used in 
Physics have their root in material things themselves. The “application” of mathematical 
structures to experiences of the material world thus has an objective foundation. The belonging 
of mathematical structures to material things is based on that the hylomorphic structure unites 
organically the singularity of a material thing and its belonging to a species. - Christianity does 
not endorse any particular solution of that problem. However, Christianity contributes to a 
solution insofar it supports strongly the genuine intelligibility of our world. The spirit of 
Christianity thus supports the view of science as a sort of realist knowledge. 
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I. Introduction 
This article focuses on the problem which is commonly called the ‘question of applicability 
of Mathematics in Physics’. As a result, a work programme is suggested for elaborating 
the view that certain mathematical structures stem somehow from material things. 
Therefore, these structures cannot be said to be ‘applied’ to material things, as if 
Mathematics were something alien to them. 
We begin by exposing certain basic features of the so called scientific revolution of the 16th 
and 17th centuries, identify certain problems caused by that revolution and formulate the 
work programme accordingly. A Chinese reader might particularly notice that the work 
programme attempts to get the different parts of the problem into a harmonious 
relationship among each other. 
It must be stressed that this problem is completely independent of any religious views. 
Nevertheless, it is Christianity that strongly encourages scientific and philosophical inquiry 
by affirming the deep intelligibility of this world. In other words, Christianity is intrinsically 
science-friendly. This will be briefly discussed in the last section of this article. 
The root of modern Physics lies in the philosophy of nature as it has been shaped in 
antiquity by the Greeks. Their philosophical reflections always were based on observations 
and brought about the notions of ‘substance’, 'change' and 'cause'. Much later, 
approximately in the 14th century, another type of knowledge expressed in numbers, 
numerical proportions and other mathematical structures joined the existent philosophy of 
nature. About two centuries later, the interplay of these two branches of knowledge 
underwent a revolutionary change. The mathematical models of material reality had 
become sufficiently sophisticated that their predictions called for experiments as the tool 
for testing them. Eventually the tandem {experiment & theory} prevailed over mere 
observation. 
Accordingly, mathematical theories in Physics became more and more dominant and 
tranformed Physics into something like a comet with a theoretical core and an 
experimental tail. At the same time, theory drifted away from experimental Physics. An 
example for how far this went is the characterization of the relationship between 
mathematical theory and material nature given by the physicist H. Hertz (1857-1894). 
According to Hertz, we make ourselves mathematical pictures or symbols of natural things 
in such a way that the mathematical consequences of the pictures also yield a picture of 
the natural development or behaviour of the corresponding natural things. This is the only 
feature that makes them symbols of material things. Therefore, it is possible that there are 
many suitable mathematical models or formulations of laws of nature1. 
The thinness of the link between the experienced physical reality and its mathematical 
model goes hand in hand, surprisingly, with the breathtaking success of mathematical 
models in Physics. It is as if the physical science of the last three centuries has finally 
discovered mathematical structures as the intelligible core of nature. Then it almost 
became a necessity that the cognitive value of experience was estimated lower and lower, 
while the trust into the cognitive value of mathematical models was increasingly 
appreciated. The influence of contemporary philosophy fostered the conviction that nature 
does not release its secrets and that, therefore, the scientist has to furnish himself a 
picture of nature. Eventually, experience - observations and experiments - ceased to be 
considered as a source of theories. Instead, human genius became considered as inventor 
of theories, which made experience comprehensible. 
Then, the conclusion can hardly be avoided that both experience and theories remain two 
bodies of knowledge independent of each other. Their juncture takes place, according to 
most physicists, only in the physicist’s mind. In other words, it is excluded that 
mathematical theories in Physics are rooted in one or other way in the material things they 
refer to. Accordingly, they are not extracted somehow from the observer’s or 
experimenter’s experience. Application of mathematical structures is something exogene 
to material things, while extraction is something endogene. 
In the former case, the success of physico-mathematical theories would be due to the 
internal organisation of the physicist’s cognitive (and maybe other) capacities only. In the 
case of ‘extraction’, it would be due also to reality. Success as well as lack of success 
takes place in physical processes and is measured in terms of fitting predictions (and 
efficient technology). That means that success is not something purely theoretical, but 
requires some practice, experimental as well as adapting mathematical tools to an 
experimental situation. Thought experiments are not sufficient. 
It is very significant that dealing jointly with experimental data and theoretical concepts is 
anything but a straightforward procedure. Rather, physicists make certain mathematical 
hypotheses motivated somehow by observational or experimental data, try to apply them 
to certain natural phenomena and then, based on that application, elaborate an approval 
or disapproval of the hypotheses in question. It seems that the hypothetical character of 
the application of mathematical theories to material things is considered to be 
unremovable. There is no evidence either that such a removal is considered necessary or 
beneficial for Physics. Physicists seem to be satisfied with a mere interlocking of both 
experience and theory, instead of an organic connection also rooted in physical reality 
than merely in the physicist’s mind. 
                                                 
1 Hertz, H., The Principles of Mechanics, Presented in a New Form. London: Macmillan 1899; Introduction. Reprints New 
York: Dover Publications 1956; Mineola, N. Y.: Dover 2003. 
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The situation sketched above suggests we put the question of whether such mathematical 
structures stem from the material things they refer to and, therefore, can somehow be 
extracted from observational or experimental data about these very same things. 
This article’s contribution to answer that question develops in two steps: after having 
supplied some more details about the interlocking of experience and mathematical 
knowledge (section II.), we present as a first step three ideas that have been shaped 
during the scientific revolution and have been highly influential in bringing about present 
day Physics. 
The first pivotal idea is that the view about the intelligibility of this world has been 
“pessimistic” for centuries (III.). The second, that the mainstream of modern Mathematics’ 
selfunderstanding does not involve any reference to the material world (IV.). Third, the 
scientific revolution has brought, for Physics, essentially its mathematization (V.). And, due 
to the way of its historical performance, the mathematization has brought about several 
problems within Physics (VI.). 
The second step offers some considerations about an agenda of overcoming these 
divisions (VII.). The main idea is to return to the unity of reality expressed by what could be 
called the metaphysical principle of no-contradiction. This in turn requires a thorough 
recourse to experience. This in turn requires positively taking into account every single 
material thing, and negatively to leave unused the known physico-mathematical theories. It 
is suggested to use, as an appropriate philosophical tool, the key notion of Thomistic 
philosophy of nature, namely hylomorphism. Among other things, hylomorphism gives a 
certain account of the singularity of each material thing. 
Christianity has no stance with respect to any particular solution of this problem. Yet 
Christianity settles a general frame for more successfully attempting its solution. This is so 
because Christianity supports the conviction of the intelligibility of this world, and 
conversely that the human mind is capable of understanding this world (VIII.). This holds 
despite of limitations and the possibility of errors of the human mind. 
 
II. The progressive character of the mathematization of Physics 
Listening to what physicists say about their own science provides deeper acquaintance 
with the intellectual climate in Physics. We confine ourselves here to quoting short 
statements about the relationship between Mathematics and material things of four 
representative physicists of the 20th century. They essentially agree irrespective of their 
different philosphical backgrounds. 
First, Albert Einstein: The world of experience and the world of concepts are united in the 
same person, but experiences do not influence the shaping of concepts and vice versa. 
Therefore it is possible that “all concepts, even those which are closest to experience, are 
from the point of logic freely chosen conventions, just as is the case with the concept of 
causality.”2 And even more explicitly: “The theoretical attitude here advocated is distinct 
from that of Kant only by the fact that we do not conceive of the “categories” as unalterable 
…, but as … free conventions. They appear to be a priori only insofar as thinking without 
                                                 
2 Einstein, A. Autobiographical Notes, in Schilpp, P. A. (ed.) Albert Einstein - Philosopher and Scientist. La Salle (Illinois, 
USA): Open Court, 1949 (first edition), p. 13. 
the positing of categories and of concepts in general would be as impossible as is 
breathing in a vacuum.”3 Nevertheless, the hermetic separation of the two worlds coexists 
with their (ununderstandable) correlation: “The very fact that the totality of our sense 
experiences is such that by means of thinking (…) it can be put in order, this fact is one 
which leaves us in awe, but which we never shall understand. … The fact that it is 
comprehensible is a miracle.”4 
The Einsteinian formula ‘incomprehensibility of the comprehensibility’ goes hand in hand 
with his view that the scientist’s epistemological attitude is divided into strongly opposed 
parts: “The scientist … must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of 
unscrupulous opportunist: he appears as a realist insofar as he seeks to describe a world 
independent of the acts of perception; as idealist insofar as he looks upon the concepts 
and theories as the free inventions of the human spirit (not logically derivable from what is 
empirically given); as positivist insofar as he considers his concepts and theories justified 
only to the extent to which they furnish a logical representation of relations among sensory 
experiences. He may even appear as Platonist or Pythagorean insofar as he considers the 
viewpoint of logical simplicity as an indispensable and effective tool of his research.” 5 
Second, Eugene P. Wigner: "The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of 
mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither 
understand nor deserve.”6 
Third, Richard P. Feynman: "I think, it is safe to say, that no one understands quantum 
mechanics. Do not keep saying to yourself, if you possibly can avoid it, "But how can it be 
like that?" because you will go "down the drain" into a blind alley from which nobody has 
yet escaped. Nobody can know how it can be like that".7 
Fourth, Roger Penrose: "I should begin by expressing my general attitude to present day 
quantum theory, by which I mean standard, non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The 
theory has, indeed, two powerful bodies of fact in its favour, and only one thing against it. 
First, in its favour are all the marvellous agreements that the theory has had with every 
experimental result to date. Second, and to me almost as important, it is a theory of 
astonishing and profound mathematical beauty. The one thing that can be said against it is 
that it makes absolutely no sense!"8 
These quotations might be interpreted as the opinion of some individuals who cannot claim 
to represent the stance of the majority of physicists. But, as a matter of fact, none of these 
views has been convincingly contradicted. 
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of quantum theory during the 30’s, 40’s and 50’s of the 20th century. 
7 Feynman, R.P., The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967, p. 129. Feynman is a major figure in 
the development of quantum theory during the 40’s, 50’s and 60’s of the 20th century. 
8 Penrose, R. Gravity and State Vector Reduction, in: R.Penrose and C.J.Isham (eds.), Quantum Concepts in Space and 
Time; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 129. Penrose is a major figure in the development of mathematical tools in 
quantum and relativity theory during the 70’s and 80’s of the 20th century. 
The trend of applying Mathematics to many fields of human knowledge is ever increasing. 
Therefore, the use of axiomatics, hypothetical deduction and universal propositions 
occupies more and more space besides the rationality proper of that field before the 
advenience of mathematical tools. The case par excellence is Physics, where evidences 
and inductive reasoning, which allows for contingency and exceptions, are increasingly 
marginalized. Besides, the common use of the expression ‚applying Mathematics‘ and 
similar ones is even a sign for a process of replacing the original rationality of experience. 
The reason is that it implicitly denies that mathematical objects or structures originate in 
some way in the objects they are ‚applied to‘. 
Applying Mathematics to physical problems is really an art of its own. But it has its limits, 
because there is always an element of trial and error in connection with a particular 
problem. This situation in turn suggests to distinguish between a purely theoretical and a 
practical knowledge of the link between mathematical objects and structures and material 
things. The theoretical knowledge answers to the question „why?“ and is missing, at least 
for the time being. The practical knowledge answers to the question „how to use?“ and is 
highly developed. 
Even more: as the history of Physics since Newton‘s times shows, the solidity of 
theoretical Physics with its wealth of ideas furnished by the clear-cut mathematical 
rationality has led to the conviction that Mathematics is more than a useful tool in Physics. 
One testimony might be sufficient: 
"Although Mathematics and Physics have grown apart in this century, Physics has 
continued to stimulate mathematical research. Partially because of this, the influence 
of Physics on Mathematics is well understood. However, the contributions of 
Mathematics to Physics are not as well understood. It is a common fallacy to 
suppose that Mathematics is important for Physics only because it is a useful tool for 
making computations. Actually, Mathematics plays a more subtle role which in the 
long run is more important. When a successful mathematical model is created for a 
physical phenomenon, that is, a model which can be used for accurate computations 
and predictions, the mathematical structure of the model itself provides a new way of 
thinking about the phenomenon. Put slightly differently, when a model is successful it 
is natural to think of the physical quantities in terms of the mathematical objects 
which represent them and to interpret similar or secondary phenomena in terms of 
the same model. Because of this, an investigation of the internal mathematical 
structure of the model can alter and enlarge our understanding of the physical 
phenomenon. Of course, the outstanding example of this is Newtonian mechanics 
which provided such a clear and coherent picture of celestial motions that it was used 
to interpret practically all physical phenomena. The model itself became central to an 
understanding of the physical world and it was difficult to give it up in the late 
nineteenth century, even in the face of contradictory evidence. A more modern 
example of this influence of Mathematics on Physics is the use of group theory to 
classify elementary particles."9 
This conviction, in turn, has paved the way for making a decisive step. So far, the 
relationship between mathematical objects and material things has been something 
outside the focus of attention. Measurements and, more generally, experiments, have 
been considered as bridges between material things and mathematical theories. Bridges 
are not part of either side; but rather a sort of third entity that connects both sides. 
Nevertheless, until the advenience of quantum physics the bridges had been practically 
neglected. 
                                                 
9 Reed, M./Simon, B., Methods of Modern Mathematical Physics, vol. I. New York, San Francisco, London: Academic 
Press, 1972, p. ix. 
But when the experimental process received its due attention, it could not be denied that 
the known physico-mathematical theories must be considered incomplete, because they 
do not describe the experimental process. But without any doubt, the experimental 
process is as natural as any other natural process, and this confronts physicists with the 
choice of (a) acknowledge this sort of incompleteness without reacting to it, for the time 
being, or trying to absorb the bridge into one of the two sides: either nature or theory. This 
latter alternative can be put as (b) trying to think the mathematical theory starting from 
material things with their own rationality, or (c) trying to think material things starting from a 
mathematical theory with its own rationality. 
Option (b) has not received any attention, while option (c) has been given considerable 
attention in the field of the foundations of Physics, for the last 50 years. Option (a) 
continues being dominant in mainstream Physics. Option (iii) is suitably called „the theory 
of measurement“. The following quotation is taken from the first monograph on the 
quantum theory of measurement. 
"We shall hope to have established a systematic description of the quantum 
mechanical measurement process together with a concise formulation of the 
measurement problem. In our view the generalized mathematical and conceptual 
framework of quantum mechanics referred to above allows for the first time for a 
proper formulation of many aspects of the measurement problem within this theory, 
thereby opening up new options for its solution. Thus it has become evident that 
these questions, which were sometimes considered to belong to the realm of 
philosophical contemplation, have assumed the status of well-defined and tractable 
physical problems".10 
To the date, the results of this attempt have not been satisfactory. Besides mathematical 
difficulties that seem to be almost unsurmountable, the idea of a theory of measurement 
has split up into different approaches that are quite different from each other11. But there 
are no signs yet that this option is going to be abandoned. This fact in turn might be 
interpreted as a sign that the spirit of mathematization has grown too strong. The same 
basic idea might be read off from some words of the influential mathematician D. Hilbert 
(1862-1943): “It is Mathematics which is the instrument that offers the connection between 
theory and practice, between thinking and observing. Mathematics is the connecting 
bridge and yields it stronger and stronger. This is why our present culture, insofar it 
concerns the intellectual comprehension and use of nature, has its basis in 
Mathematics.”12 
Concluding we might say that one can hardly avoid the impression that the rationality 
characteristic for Mathematics is marginalizing and trying to replace the rationality typical 
for the material world. But this easily can bring about the situation that, in practice, 
                                                 
10 Busch, P., Lahti, P.J., Mittelstaedt, P. The Quantum Theory of Measurement. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer-
Verlag, 
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1996, Preface, p. IX. Italics from the authors. 
11 There are several positions in competition without that comprehensive presentations or even reconciliations between 
them are at sight. The main positions can be characterized by the following key words: operationalism (theory of 
measurement), hidden variable theories, Copenhagen interpretation, many worlds, many minds, consistent histories, 
modal interpretations, quantum logic, Bohm-de Broglie interpretation, spontaneous collapse, decoherence. - An overview 
of the physical problematics can be found, for instance, in Busch, P. The Quantum Theory of Measurement. Berlin, 
Heidelberg, New York: Springer, 2002. A treatment of the philosophical problems of the quantum theory of measurement 
is offered in Mittelstaedt, P. Physics and Philosophy. The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and the Measurement 
Process. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Similarly Bub, J. Interpreting the Quantum World. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
12 Hilbert, D. Naturerkennen und Logik, Die Naturwissenschaften 18(1930), S. 959-963.The translation is mine. 
theoretical ignorance of the relationship to nature of mathematical laws of nature advances 
towards a systematic place in Physics. 
The difficulties within option (c) suggest to have a closer look at option (b). Before doing 
so, it is appropriate to ask whether physical science must be necessarily the Physics we 
are witnessing today. In fact, there are some factors located in the scientific revolution, 
which have fostered the historical development of Physics into a certain direction. But 
precisely by doing so they have created other problems. To show this is the purpose of the 
following three sections. 
 
III. Three pivotal ideas I: “Nature and human cognitive capacities do not fit 
together.” 
The purpose of this section is to make explicit the strong epistemological skepticism in 
philosophy since the times of the scientific revolution. It was inevitable that this had, on the 
long run, an equally strong impact on the emerging modern natural sciences. The 
quotations of renowned physicists at the beginning of the previous section can serve as a 
sample of that impact. We confine ourselves to a little anthology of quotations from 
influential philosophers from the beginning of the modern era until present time. 
R. Descartes (1596-1650) wished to achieve above all certainty of his knowledge. To this 
end he introduced a methodological doubt onto everything, in order to accept only what 
escapes this doubt and thus can serve as a starting point of a rational reconstruction of all 
other knowledge: "I had long before remarked that, in relation to practice, it is sometimes 
necessary to adopt, as if above doubt, opinions which we discern to be highly uncertain, 
as has been already said; but as I then desired to give my attention solely to the search 
after truth, I thought that a procedure exactly the opposite was called for, and that I ought 
to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which I could suppose the least 
ground for doubt, in order to ascertain whether after that there remained aught in my belief 
that was wholly indubitable."13 
The methodical doubt includes also sense perceptions: " When I said that the entire 
testimony of the senses should be regarded as uncertain  and even as false, I was entirely 
serious. This point is essential for a grasp of my Meditations—so much so that anyone 
who won’t or can’t accept it won’t be able to come up with any objections that deserve a 
reply."14 The methodical doubt prevails truth and is not imposed by reality, but by the 
philosopher, who transforms himself voluntarily into a rationalist. 
B. Spinoza (1632-1677) is one of those who seem to attach a sort of darkness to reality 
by saying that things are “mute”15, so that ‘true’ and ‘false’ can be referred to real things 
only in a metaphorical way. This is why he defends a rational reconstruction of a world 
view: “more geometrico demonstrata”, that is to say, in a mathematical fashion16. 
                                                 
13 Descartes, R., Discourse on the method; 4th chapter, beginning. http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/descdisc.pdf. 
ed. Jonathan Bennett. Accessed 2012-09-15. Italics are mine. 
14 Descartes, R., Objections to the Meditations on First Philosophy and Replies. Fifth set of objections (Gassendi), reply 
to an objection to the second meditation. http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfbits/desco5.pdf. ed. Jonathan Bennett. 
Accessed 2012-09-15. Italics are mine. 
15 Spinoza, B. Cogitata metaphysica. Benedicti de Spinoza opera quotquot reperta sunt, Vol. IV, I.6. Den Haag: 
M. Nijhoff, 1914, p. 198ff; the expression “res mutae” is on p. 200. 
16 Two of Spinoza’s princial works are “Renati Des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae pars I et II more geometrico 
demonstrata. Accesserunt eiusdem Cogitata Metaphysica” (Amsterdam, 1663)., and “Ethica ordine geometrico 
demonstrata” (1675). 
Spinoza’s fundamental idea is that the logical order of thoughts is the same as the order of 
the corresponding realities. 
I. Kant (1724-1804) went beyond Descartes by introducing what he viewed as a 
Copernican turn. Knowledge depends only on the human observer, not on reality: 
“Although all our knowledge begins with experience, that doesn’t mean that it all comes from 
experience.”17 According to this view, the senses do not have any influence on shaping 
concepts by the mind. Rather, the mind creates spontaneously, while guided by its own a 
priori’s, concepts and propositions. 
The essentials of the kantian view continue being wide spread among physicists. To see 
this, it is sufficient to observe that theoretical physicists are giving, by and large, 
mathematical names to physical objects. This corresponds to what Kant expresses thus: 
"The order and regularity in appearances, which we call Nature, are put there by 
ourselves. We could never find them in appearances if it weren’t that we, or the nature of 
our mind, had first put them there."18 Even though it might seem counterintuitive, the 
understanding isn’t a mere power of formulating rules through comparison of appearances; 
it is itself the lawgiver of Nature. It’s only through the understanding that Nature exists at 
all! …. Nature is the synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances according to rules. And 
appearances can’t exist outside us—they exist only in our sensibility. Thus, Nature … is 
possible only in the unity of self-awareness.”19 Using a contemporary expression, our 
experience is considered as theory-laden. 
As well as in the views of Descartes and Spinoza, also in Kant’s Copernican turn the 
communication between different humjan subjects becomes dependent on reconstruction. 
Thence the probem of ‘private languages’ arises: is it possible to give an account of private 
languages of different humans in the private language of one of them? In Physics, this 
problem can be apparently circumvented by advocating the universality of Mathematics. 
B. Russell (1872-1970) offered another variety of arguing for the need of a rational 
reconstruction by discarding what he calls ‘naïve realism’: "We all start from 'naïve 
realism', i.e. the doctrine that things are what they seem. We think that grass is green, that 
stones are hard, and that snow is cold. But physics assures us that the greenness of 
grass, the hardness of stones, and the coldness of snow, are not the greenness, 
hardness, and coldness that we know in our own experience, but something very different. 
The observer, when he seems to himself to be observing a stone, is really, if physics is to 
be believed, observing the effects of the stone upon himself. Thus science seems to be at 
war with itself: when it most means to be objective, it finds itself plunged into subjectivity 
against its will. Naïve realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naïve 
realism is false. Therefore naïve realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false. And therefore 
the behaviourist, when he thinks he is recording observations about the outer world, is 
really recording observations about what is happening in him."20 
K. Popper (1902-1994) is considered as the most influential author in 20th century- 
philosphy of science. His writings bear clearly a Kantian influence. This can be seen in that 
Popper defines in the final section of his first and most important book “The Logic of 
                                                 
17 Kant, I. Critique of pure Reason (second edition, 1787), p.1. www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/kantcpr1.pdf (ed. 
Jonathan Bennett). Accessed 2012-09-15. 
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20 Russell, B. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966 (seventh edition), p. 13. 
Scientific Discovery” (1935) the thesis of the experimenting scientist’s relationship to reality 
as theory laden experience: 
“Even the careful and sober testing of our ideas by experience is in its turn inspired by 
ideas: experiment is planned action in which every step is guided by theory. We do not 
stumble upon our experiences, nor do we let them flow over us like a stream. Rather, we 
have to be active: we have to ‘make’ our experiences. It is we who always formulate the 
questions to be put to nature; it is we who try again and again to put these questions so as 
to elicit a clear-cut ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (for nature does not give an answer unless pressed for it). 
And in the end, it is again we who give the answer, it is we ourselves who, after severe 
scrutiny, decide upon the answer to the question we put to nature.”21 
W. Stegmüller (1923-1991) is one of the many who echoes Popper: "Even though people 
are nowadays quite ready to acknowledge that we are lacking a thorough understanding of 
the phenomena of science and scientific progress, they mostly take it for granted that such 
a progress is a fact. But this too has no support at all. A priori, it cannot be expected at all 
that we achieve acceptable theories about the world. To A. Einstein is attributed the 
statement that it belongs to the most ununderstandable things of this world that the world 
is, for us, understandable. And we could add that this being understandable is a very 
limited and eternally problematic issue. "Our lack of knowledge is without limits and 
capable of making us understand what we are. Alas, it is precisely the overwhelming 
progress of the natural sciences ..., which opens our eyes again and again towards our 
lack of knowledge"."22  
In conclusion: In philosophy there is a broad, dominant and long tradition of the view that 
nature and human cognitive capacities do not fit together. However, this intellectual 
climate has not led to renouncing of investigation and communication. Instead, there have 
been offered a huge variety of attempts to substitute the supposed lack of intelligibility 
connected with the luminous and unifying source of experience by some other 
individualistic rationality. 
 
IV. Three pivotal ideas II: “Most Present day ways of understanding Mathematics are 
unrelated to the material world.” 
The selfunderstanding of Mathematics is dealt with by mathematicians as well as by 
philosophers, even though with different points of emphasis. While mathematicians focus, 
by and large, more on foundational issues of Mathematics, philosophers deal preferably 
with metaphysical and epistemological questions related to mathematical objects and 
mathematical knowledge, respectively. Nevertheless, both approaches overlap largely23. 
The view of Mathematics prima facie most attractive is the platonistic one. That is to say, 
that mathematicians refer to abstract entities which exist independently from the 
mathematician’s mind. These entities just have to be discovered, not invented, 
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notwithstanding any axiomatization of Mathematics. G. Frege (1848-1925) and K. Gödel 
(1906-1978) had views of this kind. 
Nevertheless, the three presently relevant views of Mathematics originated in the 
beginning of the 20th century and are anti-platonistic: the logicistic approach attempts a 
foundation of Mathematics by reducing it to logics. It is linked to Frege and B. Russell 
(1872-1970) and is practically abandoned. The intuistionistic approach is linked to L.E.J. 
Brouwer (1881-1966) and considers the whole of Mathematics as a mental construction. 
Mathematical objects exist only as a result of mental construction, whereby the non-
constructional proofs of existence found in classical Mathematics are considered invalid. 
Unproved mathematical conjectures as well as their negations (for instance, until 2003 the 
Poincaré conjecture) are neither true nor false. This means that the principle of excluded 
middle [for any proposition: either p is true or non-p is true] does not hold in Intuitionism. 
Instead, Intuitionism is essentially dependent on time. For instance, the Poincaré 
conjecture received a truth value only in the moment of its (affirmative) proof. Therefore, 
an intuitionistic reformulation would deeply reshape Mathematics. 
The presently dominant view among mathematicians is the formalistic approach, which is 
linked to D. Hilbert (1862-1943). It tries to understand Mathematics as a web of formal 
systems, without reference to any abstract entities. Nevertheless, the natural numbers, 
whose name suggests some proximity to the physical world, are thought to play a basic 
role within Mathematics. All anti-platonistic views rest decisively upon axiomatics. 
As the views mentioned in the previous paragraph present themselves as rather 
independent from the physical world, the undeniable success of Mathematics in natural 
sciences, above all Physics, remains ununderstood. There are, however, also attempts to 
account for that fact. In this case, not all of Mathematics appears to be linked to the 
material world. Therefore, accounts of such a link are not necessarily a foundation of 
Mathematics as a whole. Nevertheless, the multiple internal connections within 
Mathematics make it difficult to draw a distinction between parts of Mathematics relevant 
for Physics and others that are irrelevant (at present). 
One attempt to understand the link between Mathematics and the physical world goes 
back to Aristotle. He opposes the platonic view of two separated worlds – the hierachically 
ordered ideas, from which the individuals of the material world participate in one or other 
way. According to Aristotle, each material individual has – so to speak - incoporated its 
own idea or ‘substantial form’, as he calls it. 
The account of Aristotle of the status of mathematical objects is centered on five concepts: 
‘abstraction’ or ‘taking away’ or ‘removal’ or ‘subtraction’ (aphairesis), ‘precision’ 
(akribeia), ‘as separated’ (hôs kekhôrismenon), ‘qua’ or ‘in the respect that’ (hêi), and 
‘intelligible matter’ (noêtikê hylê)24. The first five concepts indicate that the status of 
mathematical objects is something secondary, derived or otherwise dependent or 
incomplete. However, the concept ‘intelligible matter’ is less obvious. And, importantly, all 
concepts indicate that mathematical objects do not exist outside the mathematician’s mind. 
Another attempt of understanding the link between Mathematics and the physical world 
has been proposed by W.V.O. Quine (1908-2000) and H. Putnam (1926-) and has 
become known as (methodological) naturalism[25]. It consists in renouncing of traditional 
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metaphysical and epistemological thinking and instead consider as basic the currently best 
scientific theories, that is to say, the currently most successful ones. They express what 
exists, what we know and the way how we know it. To this naturalistic view has to be 
added Quine’s thesis of confirmational holism: scientific experience globally confirms a 
theory as a whole, together with its methedological ingredients. As physical theories are 
formulated in mathematical terms, through which entire mathematical theories are linked to 
it, these latter are also confirmed by experience. 
Quine goes beyond this. “It seems that mathematics is indispensable to our best scientific 
theories: it is not at all obvious how we could express them without using mathematical 
vocabulary. Hence the naturalist stance commands us to accept mathematical entities as 
part of our philosophical ontology. This line of argumentation is called an indispensability 
argument”26. 
Still another attempt to understand Mathematics is called Fictionalism. It is not only 
opposed to mathematical Platonism, but also to Aristotle’s view of mathematical objects as 
derived and thus dependent from real beings. “Fictionalism holds that mathematical 
theories are like fiction stories such as fairy tales and novels. Mathematical theories 
describe fictional entities, in the same way that literary fiction describes fictional 
characters.”27 Or in more concise terms: “Fictionalism … is the view that (A) our 
mathematical sentences and theories do purport to be about abstract mathematical 
objects, as platonism suggests, but (B) there are no such things as abstract objects, and 
so (C) our mathematical theories are not true.”28 
With respect to a link of mathematical entities to the physical world, provided they are 
considered as fictional, it must be concluded that scientific theories, in particular physical 
theories, should be derived, at least in principle, without using Mathematics at all. 
Otherwise mathematical theories considered as fictional would appear to be indispensable 
for Physics. This in turn is at odds with their supposed fictional character. Comparing this 
with Einstein’s stance as mentioned in section II, it remains open whether Einstein would 
consider Mathematics as indispensable for Physics. 
In conclusion: Fictionalism and the current anti-platonistic accounts of Mathematics have 
no roots in the physical world, except (perhaps) Arithmetics. On the other hand, the 
aristotelian view of mathematical objects is based on the perceptional knowledge of the 
physical world. Both the aristotelian and the fictionalist view are opposed to mathematical 
Platonism insofar mathematical objects exist only in the scientist’s mind. The naturalistic 
view proposed by Quine is foremost characterized by putting scientific theories and not 
philosophical ones as a foundation of our knowledge. Additional principles, namely that of 
confirmational holism and the indispensability argument, are needed in order to give 
Mathematics an overall link to the physical world. 
The situation is unsatisfactory, because even the aristotelian and the naturalistic view offer 
only an utmost generic account of the link between Mathematics and the material world. 
Given the overwhelming success of mathematical theories in Physics, the most 
satisfactory rationale would be to have a view that certain mathematical objects and 
structures are something endogene from precisely those material things the behaviour of 
which they refer to. This would radically eliminate the problem of ‘why mathematics is 
applicable to nature’, as if mathematics were something exogene to nature. 
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 V. Three pivotal ideas III: “The mathematization of Physics is an essential part of the 
scientific revolution.” 
The term ‘scientific revolution’ is nowadays commonly used to characterize the historical 
period in which the medieval philosophy of nature has undergone a metamorphosis to 
yield natural sciences as we know them today. This period’s beginning is commonly 
marked by the publication of Nicolaus Copernicus’ (1473–1543) opus magnum called “De 
revolutionibus orbium coelestium” in 1543, where he proposes heliocentrism instead of 
geocentrism. But there are more major changes, which involve also basic philosophical 
ideas such as ‘cause’ and ‘order’. A certain completion was reached with I. Newton (1642–
1727), whose opus magnum carries the title “Philosophiae Naturalis Mathematica 
Principia”. Later major changes within natural sciences such as the transition from 
classical Physics to Relativity and Quantum Physics or the birth of modern Microbiology 
are sometimes also called ‘revolutionary’, but they are by far not so deep as the 
metamorphosis that took place during the roughly 200 years from Copernicus to Newton. 
Within Physics, outstanding changes during that revolutionary period include first the 
replacement of impetus (inbuilt momentum) by inertia (resistence to exterior forces), and 
second the overcoming of the world’s division into a terrestrial and a celestial region in 
virtue of universal gravitation, which in turn is linked to the overcoming of the division into 
light and heavy bodies according to their natural motion. These changes refer to 
Mechanics and Astronomy. Major changes occurred also in Optics, Chemistry and 
Medicine. 
With respect to properly scientific issues, the scientific revolution is a huge web of many 
discoveries and developments. They are accompanied, even made possible, by only a 
few, but deep philosophical changes. One of them is the replacement of causes by laws of 
nature. The classical view was that of a bundle of four interconnected causes, introduced 
by Aristotle. Two of them were intrinsic (or constitutive) causes of a material thing, namely 
form and matter, and two of them were extrinsic causes, namely efficient and final cause. 
In the course of the scientific revolution, the final cause was dropped altogether, the 
efficient cause became the most important, and the material and formal cause were 
replaced by something more or less unified and gave rise to an atomistic view of material 
things. 
Again, the prominence of efficient causes favoured the importance of experiments. Among 
these, measurements became particularly important, because they gave way to abstract 
laws of nature. In Physics and Astronomy, laws of nature could most conveniently be 
formulated in mathematical terms, such that Galilei (1564–1642) could say that the book of 
nature “is written in mathematical letters”29. Mathematical laws of nature, in turn, allow for 
calculability, predicitons and hence technology. 
As a consequence of the profound changes in philosophy of nature and scientific 
knowledge, there was a profound change of how the human person as a whole related to 
the nature he or she was living in. The historian of science A. Koyré is one of the first in 
using deliberately the word ‘revolution’, when he says, for instance: “… this revolution, one 
of the deepest, if not the deepest, mutations and transformations accomplished – or 
suffered – by the human mind since the invention of the cosmos by the Greeks, two 
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thousand years before.” 30 In other words, such an increasing dominium of nature caused a 
transition from a sort of contemplative life (vita contemplativa) to an active life (vita 
activa)31. 
Koyré pinpoints the significance of the scientific revolution for the mindset of mankind by 
giving two characteristics: “(a) the destruction of the cosmos, and therefore the 
disappearance from science … of all considerations based on this concept, and (b) the 
geometrization of space … nearly equivalent to the mathematization (geometrization) of 
nature and therefore the mathematization (geometrization) of science. The disappearance 
– or destruction – of the cosmos means that the world of science, the real world, is no 
more seen, or conceived, as a finite and hierarchically ordered, therefore qualitatively and 
ontologically differentiated, whole, but as an open, indefinite, and even infinite universe, 
united not by its immanent structure but only by the identity of its fundamental contents 
and laws. … This in turn, implies the disappearance – or the violent expulsion – from 
scientific thought of all conderations based on value, perfection, harmony, meaning, and 
aim, because these concepts, from now on merely subjective, cannot have a place in the 
new ontology.”32 
Thus there are good reasons to think that the mathematization of Physics has been the 
most important single factor in bringing about the scientific revolution33. On the one hand, 
the “silence” of nature most certainly has influenced the view that Mathematics is by itself 
unrelated to nature. On the other hand, the experimental findings have contributed to 
giving the mathematization of nature its role as a source of rationality and of 
consequences in practice (technology) and in mindset (dominium of nature). But the 
mathematization has also raised philosophical questions concerning the relationship 
between nature and the mathematical laws of nature, as has been sketched in section I. 
These are questions of a theoretical understanding, part of which will be addressed in the 
following section. 
 
VI. Four problems in Physics raised by the scientific revolution 
One question at the very root of the mathematization of our view of nature concerns the 
experiment called ‘measurement’: Everybody has learned to perform simple 
measurements of length, weight and time. Perhaps this very fact has made him or her 
forget to wonder about why it is possible that two different things can be compared at all. 
Why is it that different measuring devices applied to the same object yield approximately 
equal results? On the other hand, why are the results of different performances of 
measuring the same object only approximately equal? 
At this point, it must be noted that the formulations in the preceding paragraph depend on 
the fact thatthe human obser ver/experimenter fits into his measurement as a macroscopic 
body. Therefore, descriptions like ‘long’, ‘short’, heavy’, light’, fast’, ‘slow’ and the like are 
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made in relation to macroscopic units. But there is a qualitative difference between the 
macroscopic and the microscopic realm. For instance, while the diameter of a macroscopic 
sphere can be measured by other macroscopic devices, nobody has ever verified that an 
elementary particle, e.g. an electron, has a geometrical shape, let alone has measured it. 
Only by hypothetical assumptions and extrapolations from the macroscopic world a 
physicist might give an electron such geometrical properties. 
In other words, the practice of Physics contradicts its theoretical view: on the one hand, 
the generally accepted view that elementary particles and atoms are more fundamental 
than solid bodies in the sense that solid bodies “consist” somehow of elementary particles. 
On the other hand, we find the practice of not tracing the results obtained by macroscopic 
devices back to the fundamental categories of Physics, which are those of the microscopic 
realm. Indeed, consistently carrying through this idea would amount to a major internal 
reform of Physics. One might well object that this enterprise is almost impossible, and that 
it is not clear how much use Physics would get from it. But such objections “a priori” can 
hardly be proved. 
A second problem arises from the fact that in mathematical laws of nature, the description 
of behaviour is dissociated from the reference to the individuals, the behaviour of which 
they describe. Rather, the connection of a law with “its” individuals is exclusively a 
performance within the experimental physicist. 
Truly, predictability and its consequences, above all technology, have been achieved by 
mathematical laws of nature. But this has been achieved by at the expenses of intrinsic 
reference of a law to “its” individuals. Obviously, this is a characteristic of the imperfect 
interlocking of mathematics and nature referred to in section I. And it makes it more easy 
to understand that the mathematical laws of nature are not obtained by a sort of derivation 
starting from observational or experimental data. Rather they are hypthetically conceived 
and then in a procedure of trial and error “applied” to material things. 
One might well object that the universality of a law of nature cannot be achieved otherwise 
than by a loss of intrinsic reference to individuals. Even more: that a law of nature refers 
intrinsically to a particular individual can hardly mean anything else than that this law of 
nature is completely confined to that particular individual. It seems that we find ourselves 
before the choice {lack of reference & universality} versus {incorporated reference & no 
universality}. But again, this is not proved. Rather one could argue that true laws of nature 
should be more comprehensive by incorporating individuality as well as universality. 
Mathematical structures are only part of such a comprehensive law of nature. 
A third problem is related to the twosidedness of every measuring process referred to in 
the beginning of this section. Measurements are based upon the action of the measuring 
object on the measuring device. But the device – though being an artifact of natural things 
- is not less a thing of nature than the measuring object. In rigor, then, we have to speak of 
an interaction of both sides of an experiment. But then, what have we to make with the 
following words of W. Heisenberg (1901-1976): 
"Truly, our accustomed description of nature and in particular the idea that processes in 
nature follow strict laws are based upon the assumption that it is possible to observe 
phenomena without exercising an notable influence on them. To attribute a certain cause 
to a certain effect makes sense only if we can observe effect and cause without 
intervening at the same time in the process perturbing it."34 But: "By means of the 
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intervention necessary for the experiment we destroy certain connections that are 
characteristic for the microscopic world."35 
Another prominent text of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen highlights the same idea: "Any 
serious consideration of a physical theory must take into account the distinction between 
the objective reality, which is independent of any theory, and the physical concepts with 
which the theory operates. ... Every element of the physical reality must have a 
counterpart in the physical theory. .... If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can 
predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, 
then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity." 
(Italics by the authors.)36 
Even though these formulations have been made many decades ago, they do influence 
the present day view of most physicists: experiments are unilateral in the sense that 
experimental devices are expected to yield information about the experimental object, but 
not vice versa. But physicists learned in the context of quantum physics that they both do 
interact. Thus the question arises of what hinders to draw the consequence and treat both 
side equally? 
A fourth problem comes from the temporal limitations imposed on experiments. In practice, 
all experiments are cut out from their environment by boundaries in time. This seems very 
reasonable, because the experimenter wishes to obtain results in finite time. But does a 
temporal limitation correspond, in rigor, to something in nature? Is it not plausible that 
limitations of that kind, which are considered to yield simplifications and practicability, on 
the long run rather import problems? A similar question could be formulated with respect to 
spatial limitations. 
Summing up we can say that the scientific revolution has brought great achievements in 
Physics. But it has also introduced new problems into Physics. The most serious ones are, 
to my mind, the four aforementioned: (1) The microscopic realm is characterized by means 
of the macroscopic one. The full picture requires the conceptual tools in order to 
understand the macroscopic realm in terms of the microscopic realm. But precisely that 
cannot be done with the means of present day Physics, because mathematical laws of 
nature, being universal, cannot catch the unrepeatable features of the individual material 
things the behaviour of which they are supposed to describe. This is problem (2). Problem 
(3) concerns the profound conflict between two antagonistic features of every experiment: 
on the one hand, it is a means for gaining information, but on the other hand, it disturbs 
that information. Perhaps here must be found an appropriate understanding of the activity 
and passivity of material things. The dynamics in turn is linked to problem (4) which 
concerns the division of the world into limited space-time regions, in which experiments 
are are considered to be confined. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Thus it turns out that te four problems sketched in the previous section are connected with 
each other. In some sense, they form a chain, wherefore a renouncing of the spatio-
temporal limits of experiments (problem (4)) obliges to deal with problems (1) – (3), too. At 
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this point, one has to choose between two alternatives. Either one declares the success of 
unreformed Physics as satisfactory. Then Physics continues as until now with the inbuilt 
risk that the mentioned four problems exercise an uncontrolled influence. Or one tackles 
the internal reform of mathematical Physics in favour of its transparency and internal 
consistency. This requires extremely much work, but it might yield, on the long run, an 
even deeper success. In this latter case, the very success of mathematical theories in 
Physics strongly suggests to combine the task of solving the four aforementioned 
problems with the inquiry of why and how specific mathematical structures somehow have 
their roots in material things. These two aims determine the following basics of a work 
programme: 
(α) Renounce of the spatial and temporal limitations of experiments and allow for 
unlimited interaction of material things. 
(β) Give equal weight to both sides of interactions, e.g. in an experiment. 
(γ) Renounce of using any physico-mathematical theory. 
(δ) Base your considerations exclusively on experience that is not theory-laden. 
(ε) Try to determine the “reflective loop”: namely that microscopic bodies build up 
the bodies of the macroscopic realm, which are the ones that allow to specify 
bodies of the microscopic realm. In other words, all microscopic bodies 
together are somehow dynamically balanced with all microscopic bodies. 
(ζ) Try to extract mathematical structures inductively from all these experiences. 
The view expressed here is innovative because this work programme pretends to achieve 
more than presenting just a parallel philosophical view of nature which does not really 
interfere with how physicists are exercising their profession. It also pretends more than to 
provide methodological standards for physical investigation. If it succeeds, it could be 
called in all propriety an internal reform of Physics. 
* 
Despite of its innovative character, the above work programme does not look promising. 
Things might change to the better, when we go searching for philosophical forerunners. 
Such a philosophical forerunner would have to meet two conditions. First, it must be 
experience-based. In other words, experience is understood as a genuin source of 
knowledge. What is more, the gap between particular perceptions and a universal theory 
requires an intelligible link, namely induction. Additionally, such a forerunner should offer 
an account of the activity and passivity of material things. This condition dissuades from 
relying on rationalist philosophies. 
The second condition concerns the singularity of material things. In order to account for 
the interaction of individual material things, their singularity must necessarily be taken into 
account. But it cannot be adequately expressed by using exclusively concepts or linguistic 
terms: Neither universal concepts (for instance, the platonic διάιρεσις) nor even 
demonstrative pronouns would do it. The only linguistic means to refer precisely to this 
individual is by proper names. But while it is possible to give proper names to macroscopic 
things, for instance volcanos, rivers or trees, it is impossible to link proper names to single 
atoms or elementary particles. Therefore, the second condition dissuades from relying on 
the analytic way of doing philosophy37. Beyond the limits of language alone, one can refer 
to a material thing by pointing a finger at it. This requires sense perception, sight in 
particular. But this procedure is simply impossible in the case of elementary particles. 
Does that mean that the proposed work programme aims at something impossible? As a 
matter of fact, the hylomorphism proposed by Aristotle and, in a different framework, by 
Thomas Aquinas, has a certain account of the singularity of material things. So the work 
programme can, perhaps, make use of an already developed philosophical conceptuality. 
However, it is impossible to give an appropriate account of this particular feature of 
hylomorphism in a few paragraphs. 
It must be admitted that Aristotelian as well as Thomistic philosophy of nature are 
considered outdated. However, they have never really been brought in contact with 
experiment and, in particular, measurement, which is an essential of modern Physics. My 
claim is that the metaphysical core of Thomistic philosophy of nature is useful for modern 
Physics. For the present problem, the first relevant metaphysical notion is ‘hylomorphism’. 
It refers to the constitution of material things as members of species or agglomerations of 
such members. The second relevant piece is the general principle called ‘agere sequitur 
esse’. It expresses a sort of proportionality between the dynamics of something and what it 
is. Thus, this principle can be claimed to offer a rationale for how laws of nature do stem 
from the very things they refer to38. 
 
VIII. Is there any specific contribution of Christianity to solving the problem? 
Let us anticipate the answer: Indeed, there is a specific contribution of Christianity to solve 
that problem. But Christianity does not do so by making assertions that belong to the 
competence of professionals in Natural Sciences or Mathematics. Christianity contributes 
exclusively to a philosophical issue by stating a positive view of the intelligibility of this 
world. Obviously, this view is opposed to what has been said in section III. about the view 
of most modern philosophers. 
The New Testament as well as the Old Testament make far reaching statements about the 
intelligibility of this world. In particular, the Catholic Church is most explicit in linking both 
objective intelligibility and subjective capacity of understanding together. She does so by 
stating that it is possible that somebody reaches, without having any knowledge about 
Christianity, the insight that the things of this world are what the Bible calls ‘created’ and 
that they, therefore, have a Creator39. 
Nothing is said, in this context, about the intellectual path to be followed, not even whether 
such an intellectual path has been, or will be, realized in history or the future. The 
statement is confined to saying that the things of this world “give an account” on their 
being created, and that human mind is capable of understanding this language of reality. 
From the Catholic point of view, Christian revelation is epistemologically “optimistic”. It 
follows that experience has a positive cognitive value. 
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As the status ‘created’ of a thing comprehends whatever belongs to it, no information 
about this thing can be separated from the insight into its being created. In our context, the 
emphasis lies on the following conclusion: given the premises (1) the behaviour of material 
things stems precisely from those same things, (2) the knowledge of this behaviour, 
expressed in laws of nature, is connected with the insight into the being created of those 
things, it follows that the search for laws of nature profits from the intelligibility of the world 
and the cognitive capacity of the human mind, at least insofar as the laws of nature 
contribute to the knowledge of things as being created. 
Therefore, a scientist who happens to be a Christian is, by his faith, enabled to an 
“epistemological optimism”. And exactly by this, a scientist who happens to be a Christian 
is almost forbidden by his faith to base the particular propositions of his scientific discourse 
in any way on this very same faith. He is exclusively relegated to his natural capacity of 
insight and reasoning. 
For the sake of clarity, it should be added that the assertions of the Bible about single 
historical facts such as the age of the universe, of the earth and of mankind or the 
extension and dating of the flood are particular assertions. They should be evaluated in the 
light of the Bible’s universal affirmations about the intelligibility of this world and, perhaps, 
in the light of further exegetical criteria. In this context, creationists easily give too much 
credit to present day natural sciences, if they do not examine whether the epistemological 
climate in these sciences is compatible with the epistemological climate generated and 
witnessed by Christian revelation. 
True, Christian faith tells also, that sinfulness darkens the human mind and makes its 
activity laborious, but it does not make it impossible. Therefore, scientific reasoning 
continues depending exclusively on every scientist’s own intellectual capacity and his or 
her professional training. A scientist who happens to be a Christian possesses by his faith 
a guarantee that the thesis of the intelligibility of the world and the cognitive capacity of the 
human mind is true. He or she has more intellectual steadfastness in the laborious activity 
of investigating this world. Likewise, God’s grace and a Christian’s striving to follow Christ 
contribute to that same goal. But this interior strength does not provide arguments which 
would be less accessible to non-believers, or not accessible at all. 
In conclusion, the statement “there is no specifically Christian way of doing science” is 
ambiguous. A scientist who happens to be a Christian, should not draw on the Christian 
revelation, or on the Bible in particular, when making scientific propositions or proving 
them. Rather he should exclusively focus on the object in question and use his human 
capacities of inquiry and rational discourse. In that sense, the statement cited is true. But if 
it comes to the existence of truth at all, which touches the very notion of science, or to the 
fundamental discernment between an “epistemological optimistic (bright) or pessimistic 
(obscure) climate”, this statement is false. The Christian way of doing science is 
embedded in an epistemologically bright or optimistic climate. 
 
IX. Final Remark 
The claim that the mathematization of Physics performed in the course of the scientific 
revolution during the 16th and 17th centuries should be corrected is based on good 
reasons. It would be a thorough internal reform, almost a second scientific revolution. This 
is why it should not only be judged by its success in showing why and how mathematical 
structures are rooted in material things. It must also explain why the present mathematical 
Physics has been so successful, despite the problems sketched in section VI. 
